Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 41
Issue 3 Issue 3 - April 1988

Article 9

4-1988

BOOK REVIEW: LEGAL PAPERS OF ANDREW JACKSON
Walter F. Pratt, Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Legal History Commons

Recommended Citation
Walter F. Pratt, Jr., BOOK REVIEW: LEGAL PAPERS OF ANDREW JACKSON, 41 Vanderbilt Law Review 667
(1988)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol41/iss3/9

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more
information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

BOOK REVIEW

Edited by James W. Ely, Jr. and
Theodore Brown, Jr. Knoxville, Tenn.: The University of Tennessee
Press, 1987, pp. lxvi, 420.
LEGAL PAPERS OF ANDREW JACKSON.

Reviewed by Walter F. Pratt, Jr.*
The Legal Papersof Andrew Jackson is a handsomely edited book
and a credit both to its editors and its publisher." James W. Ely, Jr. and
Theodore Brown, Jr. have done an impressive job of supplementing the
limited manuscript record with information about the attorneys, the litigants, and the issues involved in each of the selected cases.' In fact,
the additions are so substantial that the title is somewhat misleading:
this is really a carefully documented account of the history of law in
central Tennessee between 1787 and 1804.1 The result is a valuable addition to the emerging history of law in early America. One can only
hope that this will not merely become part of what one reviewer termed
the "last extended series to contain the papers of a great American'"4
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.

1. The Legal Papers of Andrew Jackson is a supplement to The Papers of Andrew Jackson
(S. Smith, H. Owsley, H. Moser & S. Macpherson eds. 1980, 1984), also published by the University of Tennessee Press.
2. The editors were hindered by the fact that most of Jackson's papers and those of his
contemporaries in the Tennessee legal community have not survived. LEGAL PAPERS OF ANDREW
JACKSON IX-iXi, xliv (J. Ely & T. Brown eds. 1987) [hereinafter LEGAL PAPERS].
3.

I refer especially to the almost 50-page introduction and the equally long biographical

register of Jackson's colleagues in the legal profession. Both are valuable starting points for anyone
doing research in the period. The editors have already begun the exploration of Tennessee's early
legal history using these papers. See Ely, Andrew Jackson as Tennessee State Court Judge, 17981804, 40 TENN. HisT. Q. 144 (1981); Ely, The Legal Practiceof Andrew Jackson, 38 TENN. HisT. Q.
421 (1979); Note, The Tennessee County Courts Under the North Carolinaand TerritorialGovernments: The Davidson County Court of Pleas and Quarter Sessions, 1783-1796, as a Case
Study, 32 VAND. L. REV. 349 (1979) (authored by Theodore Brown).
4. Rogers, Book Review, 83 S.C. HIsT. MAG. 80, 80 (1982). One would also hope that the
success of this compilation would encourage the collection of manuscripts in one place, preferably

the state archives. The editors' descriptions of lost materials and of journeys to remote county
seats are distressing, though familiar. Surely the time has come for each state to have a single,

central archive to maintain all court records that are more than, say, 50 years old.
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and that publishers will be encouraged by this success to continue to
make manuscripts available to a wide audience.'
Although not advertised as a contribution to the celebration of the
bicentennial of the Constitution, this book is that as well. Andrew Jackson became a member of the bar on September 26, 1787, the very day
that Congress first considered the proposed Constitution.' In the same
month one James Robertson deeded his half interest in lot nine in
Nashville to a James Lanier. None of those events of September 1787
created a fissure in history; they reflect more continuities than disjunctions. The actions of the Philadelphia Convention, to be sure, have had
a more momentous impact than did Jackson's admission to the bar.
Even so, Jackson's brief career in the law, as illustrated in this volume,
reminds us of the continuously emerging mosaic of American legal culture. Especially in a "Bicentennial Year," it is all too easy to allow the
allure of federal constitutional law to overshadow the more mundane
but arguably more important events in the trenches of the legal system.
This volume corrects our focus by giving us a legal footsoldier's view of
law in the frontier society of Tennessee as the eighteenth century became the nineteenth.
Having presented a corrected, or at least complementary, view, this
volume is still sufficiently rich to suggest any number of topics for further research. For a "legal" or "judicial" biography of Jackson the
sources are inadequate because Jackson left so few traces; yet for a history of the legal profession the sources are highly suggestive because
Jackson provides an archetype.
All who have searched legal manuscripts for information about
judges or lawyers will find much that is familiar here. The pleadings are
so filled with formal language that they furnish frustratingly little insight into the actual facts behind each case. The records are agonizingly
lacking in evidence about the nature of actual argument before the
judges. The judicial opinions are so sparse that we get only the barest
glimpse into the judicial process. The editors have responded admirably
to these gaps in the manuscript records. Using the records as a framework, they have constructed an annotated bibliography, and even
5. There are no doubt other items worthy of publication, but I especially have in mind The
Bland Casebook, which the editors discovered at the Maryland Historical Society in Baltimore.
This manuscript is 140 pages long and contains reports of superior court cases written by Theodorick Bland while he was in Tennessee between 1799 and 1801. See LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 2, at
lxv. For an example of the successful publication of court documents, see 1-4 NORTH CAROLINA
HIGHER-COURT RECORDS [SECOND SERIES] (M. Parker & W. Price eds. 1968-74) and 5-6 NORTH
CAROLINA HIGHER-COURT MINUTES [SECOND SERIES] (W. Price ed. 1974-81 ).
6. See 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS, 1776-1787, at 322, 327-28 (M. Jensen ed. 1976)
7. LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 2, at 90.
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prosopography, for early Tennessee.
From the editors' efforts we have a valuable statistical picture of
Jackson's practice. For example, Jackson, as prosecutor, had a conviction rate of just over sixty percent in criminal cases." As a private attorney he sometimes tried eight jury cases in a single day." Obviously those
statistics contribute to our understanding of the frontier court system,
allowing us to better compare developments in the first southwest with
those in the original colonies. Likewise, Jackson's experiences tell us a
great deal about the kinds of cases decided by the courts of early Tennessee. The editors, for example, call attention to the "vigorous economy of land speculation and [the] burgeoning commerce" reflected in
the cases.' 0
But the editors also show us a problem with many sources of this
kind: we learn little about Jackson the man. 1 The Jackson encountered in this volume is not the swashbuckling military hero. It is not
even the Jackson who, as judge, steps down from the bench and singlehandedly apprehends a menacing criminal. 12 Instead, we find a Jackson
who was a "gentleman" of "unblemished moral character."' 3 Indeed! In
short, the problem for any prospective biographer is that the papers tell
us what Jackson did but not what he thought. The sources do not allow
a biographer to provide the "graphic portrayal of character and exploit"
that is essential to any biography. 4
The primary difficulty facing any biographer is that, in spite of the
volume's title, Jackson himself plays but a small role. These are really
the legal papers of middle Tennessee. Fittingly for a collection centered
on the hero of the common people,' 5 yet also ironically for a man who
gave his name to an era of American politics,' there are no figures who
tower over the legal landscape in the way that James Madison stands
astride the Philadelphia convention or John Marshall reigns over the
8. Id. at xxxviii. For articles based on these manuscripts, see supra note 2.
9.

LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 2, at xl.

10. Id. at xli; see, e.g., id. at 22-27 (Jackson representing Detroit mercantile firm); id. at 6067 (Jackson seeking to recover client's share of expenses for transport of goods between Pennsylvania and Nashville); id. at 78-89 (Jackson representing Maryland merchant).
11. See id. at liii-liv.
12. The editors report in an appendix their unsuccessful efforts to verify this tale of Russell
Bean. Id. at 395-97. I must concede to being torn between admiring their professional skills and
recalling an image of the Grinch who stole another legend.
13. Id. at 3 (Jackson's license to practice in the county courts of North Carolina).
14. Lee, Principles of Biography, in ELIZABETHAN AND OTHER ESSAYS 31, 51 (F. Boas ed.
1929).
15. Cf. R. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE COURSE OF AMERICAN FREEDOM, 1822-1832, at
116 (1981) (stating that "Jackson saw his role as the champion of the people").
16. See generally A. SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF JACKSON (1945); J. WARD, ANDREW JACKSON,
SYMBOL FOR AN AGE (1955).
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Constitution itself. Those who populate this volume, though not petty,
are by no means giants. Jackson serves as the focal point more because
of fame earned by later political activities than because of any excellence in his legal career. The available sources give us only the occasional insight into Jackson's intellect or personality. Indeed, for insight
into Jackson's character, one would look in vain even in the main
volumes of this series 17 because the "many invisible circumstances...
are more important than publick [sic] occurrences. ' I s
The manuscript sources cannot, therefore, support a biography of
any single member of this early nineteenth century legal community.
That fact does not, however, diminish the value of these papers, for
they offer a wealth of information about their legal community. They
allow us to study Jackson and other lawyers "in terms of their broader
involvement in the everyday life of their local communities, whose mores they necessarily shared to a greater or lesser degree." 9 In particular,
these papers suggest two especially intriguing topics for those who
would "row out over [the] great ocean of material and lower down into
it, here and there, a little bucket, which will bring up to the light of day
some characteristic specimen, from those far depths, to be examined
with a careful curiosity. ' ' 20 For both the emergence of American law and
the development of legal ethics this volume reveals a legal system on
the verge of substantial change. Careful study of the evidence will allow
us to better understand the colonial legal system and that of the early
nineteenth century.
First, and above all else, this book evidences the powerful continuity of the English common law.2 ' But there are also signs of an
emerging American law-a process of birth that certainly merits careful
attention as we expand our knowledge beyond New England.22 The
reader is likely to be struck initially by the dearth of what might be
termed "local" arguments and precedents. Attorneys refer to English
17. See 1-2 THE PAPERS OF ANDREW JACKSON (S. Smith, H. Owsley, H. Moser & S. Macpherson eds. 1980, 1984); see also 1-7 THE CORRESPONDENCE OF ANDREW JACKSON (J. Bassett ed. 1926-

35).
18. Johnson, Rambler No. 60 (Oct. 13, 1750), reprinted in 3 THE YALE EDITION OF THE
WORKS OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 321 (W. Bate & A. Strauss eds. 1969).
19. M. BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCmTY, 1776-1876, at viii (1976).
20. L. STRACHEY, EMINENT VICTORIANS V (1919); cf. Frank, Ingredients of JudicialBiography,
24

L.J. 374, 375 (1949)judicial biography "is a peephole into an era").
21. Cf. LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 2, at xxviii-xxx. See also the invoice for books that Jackson
purchased in 1797 from a Philadelphia bookseller, id. at 5-6, and the notes taken by Jackson on
the oral argument by counsel in 1802, id. at 233-34. The invoice shows that most of the books
Jackson purchased were English; the notes show that most of the cases cited by counsel were
English.
22. See AMBIVALENT LEGACY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE SOUTH (D. Bodenhamer & J. Ely eds.
1984); see also Finkelman, Exploring Southern Legal History, 64 N.C.L. REv. 77 (1985).
IND.
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precedent, followed by unchallenged observations that the similarity
between English and Carolina statutes requires that they be applied in
a like manner.2 s Anyone expecting to find a freewheeling frontier law
will be surprised to read a comment by one of Jackson's colleagues on
the bench that "where the Practice of this country is unsettled it is
proper to recur to that of England."2' 4 Thus it happened that a lighted
squib thrown in a county market in England and an Indian provincial
prince came to influence a court in frontier Tennessee of 1801.25 This
volume, then, well illustrates the strength of the intellectual tradition
that so tightly unified the new nation even at the moment when it precariously considered whether to throw off the Articles of Confederation
in favor of the new Constitution.
There are, however, sporadic signs of an emerging American law. In
public law, the new national and state constitutions percolated quickly
to the frontier legal community. For example, in 1798, only two years
after Tennessee joined the union, Jackson and others petitioned against
a Tennessee law that required twelve months residence before anyone
could be admitted to practice law. The petitioners asserted that the law
was "inconsistent with the spirit of the federal constitution which declares that citizens of the United States shall be entitled to all the privileges of citizenship in the several states."2 6 Similarly, in 1800 an
attorney argued (though without citation or elaboration) that it was a
violation of the Tennessee Constitution to impose the death penalty for
27
horse stealing.
The final year of the eighteenth century also offers a revealing example from private law. The dispute involved efforts to recover on a
note that was twenty-five years old. The defendant's attorney relied
upon a presumption of payment after a lapse of so much time. The
attorney for the plaintiff responded:
It ought to be recollected by the Jury that the cases read [by the opposing attorney] are decisions of the British Courts and principally founded on the nature of
that country. Such is the narrow insular situation of Great Britain that it is almost
impossible for a Debtor to remove out of the reach of his Creditor[.] [I]f the Debtor
had gone to the most remote corner of the Island the Creditor could easily pursue
or send after him have suit brot and enforce the payment[.] [B]ut how different is
the nature of the U.S. [T]he citizens are spread over an immense tract of Country
and so little social intercourse carried on amongst those citizens that an age almost
might elapse before the Creditor could possibly discover the retreat of his abscond23. LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 2, at 139. The act concerned the admissibility of book accounts. See also id. at 113-14 (depicting a similar dispute about another statute).
24. Id. at 292-93.
25. Id. at 210-11 nn.2-3. The cases are Scott v. Shepherd, 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (K.B. n.d.), and
Rafael v. Verelst, 96 Eng. Rep. at 579 (K.B. n.d.).
26. LEGAL PAPEaS, supra note 2, at 102.
27. Id. at 148.
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ing Debtor even if he were
to use all the diligence in his power, in England this
28
could never be the case.

Apparently accepting the plaintiff's argument, the court concluded that
the question of payment, under the circumstances of the lapse of time,
was one for the jury. 9
On another occasion the court also let a case go to the jury, rejecting the common law distinction between trespass and case. "The
line of distinction," the court said, "in many instances, is so nice, that it
seems difficult to discover it." 3 0 If other instances could be found, the
two cases might provide the nucleus for an analysis of the role of the
jury in early Tennessee."1 Regardless of the availability of other records,
the court's willingness to ignore a distinction between trespass and case
is provocative. Less than a year before, the court had dismissed a plaintiff's writ for using the phrase "a plea of Case" and omitting the words
"Trespass on." 2 The apparent inconsistency between the two holdings
is all the more suggestive because the earlier case (which the court did
not allow to reach the jury) involved one of the rare examples of an
attorney being sued for malpractice.
The treatment of malpractice suggests the second of the topics deserving of "careful curiosity"-the development of legal ethics. Even
more striking than the court's willingness to protect an attorney is
Jackson's seeming disregard for proper conduct as either a lawyer or a
judge. He acted as an arbitrator in a case in which he had appeared as
counsel; 3 he served as a judge in cases in which he had represented one
of the parties; 4 and he even sat as judge in cases in which he was a
28. Id. at 165-66. The use of the verb "read" in the passage quoted in text suggests the
nature of the argument to the court. The lawyers clearly had access to printed English reports
which they apparently read to the court. Furthermore, the absence of written briefs or memoranda
throughout this volume shows the legal culture to be predominantly oral. For a more complete
understanding of the development of the legal system, we need to know when lawyers and judges
began to communicate with each other in writing. To the extent that writing became distinctive, it
would serve to separate the professional communications from the inevitably oral communications
with a jury. For a more technical argument addressed to the differences between English and
American appellate procedure, see id. at 195-96. See also the discussion of Tennessee's divorce law
as being more liberal than that in England. Id. at 256-57.
29. Id. at 166.
30. Id. at 209-10.
31. In a similar vein, the editors report two instances of judges joining petitions for clemency
for defendants convicted in trials before the same judges. Id. at 127 (Jackson did not join the
petition); id. at 224 (Jackson signed this petition). The jurors' petition for clemency raises further
questions about the complex factors that would ameliorate the harshness of the criminal law. For
instance, in 1801 Jackson and another judge granted a defendant's plea of benefit of clergy. Id. at
212-15.
32. Id. at 182, 184.
33. Id. at 92-93.
34. See id. at 107-08, 151; see also id. at 80 (Jackson filed petition for client with court of
which he was a member though he did not sit with court when it rendered a decision).
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party.

Jackson's actions seem to violate the spirit, if not the language, of
the Tennessee Constitution: "No judge shall sit on the trial of any cause
where the parties shall be connected with him, by affinity or consanguinity, except by consent of parties." 6 Moreover, Jackson's conduct
violated a maxim of ancient lineage: "nemo sibi esse judex vel suis jus
dicere debet." 7 Jackson's conduct in the face of such powerful edicts is
puzzling. Possibly his insensitivity to ethical issues reveals his true personality-and we at last encounter the rake we expected. Yet Jackson
continued to be one of the most popular, if not most respected, legal
figures in middle Tennessee." Therefore, it seems likely that his conduct was not an aberration. If Jackson did share the mores of his local
community, then the editors have again given us a valuable benchmark.
They quote G. Edward White's observation that the "specter of judicial
conflicts of interest did not loom large to nineteenth-century Americans." 9 But that comment only raises the issue; it does not explain.
Why, for example, if the issue was truly unimportant would it merit
even a limited provision in the state constitution?
These papers are especially valuable for suggesting the chronology
of inquiry because Jackson would himself later campaign against corruption in Washington, D.C. 0 In turn, the subsequent excesses of Jacksonian democracy found an articulate opponent in David Hoffman, "the
father of American legal ethics.""' Hoffman originally included "Observations on Professional Deportment" in his Course of Legal Study in
1817.2 Reacting "against the debasement of professional mores that he
perceived in the Jacksonian era,"4 Hoffman expanded his observations
to a list of Fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment,
35. Id. at 201 & n.1; id. at 263; see also id. at 151-56 (Jackson sat as judge on case in which
he was potentially liable as assignor of note in dispute).
36. TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. V, § 8. At least one other judge recused himself in similar
circumstances, though the editors could discover no direct evidence of the reason. LEGAL PAPERS,
supra note 2, at Ivi.
37. "No man ought to be his own judge, or to administer justice in cases where his relations
are concerned." See, e.g., H. BROOM, A SELECTON OF LEGAL MAXIMS 116 (7th Am. ed. 1874).
38.

R. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE COURSE OF AMERICAN EMPIRE, 1767-1821, at 124

(1977). As the editors note, "[A]s a lawyer, Jackson experienced considerable success and enjoyed a
favorable reputation." LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 2, at xliv.
39. LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 2, at Ivi
(quoting G. WHITE,THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION
40 (1976)). For another account of the development of ethical concerns in the early republic, see J.
NOONAN, BRIBES 427-51 (1984).

40. See J. NOONAN, supra note 39, at 449-51.
41. T. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS 59 (1985). The second chapter of American Legal
Ethics is devoted to an exploration of Hoffman's principles. See id. at 59-164; see also Bloomfield,

David Hoffman and the Shaping of a Republican Legal Culture, 38 MD. L. REv. 673 (1979).
42.
43.

T. SHAFFER, supra note 41, at 59.
Bloomfield, supra note 41, at 684.
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which he published in 1836. 44 Among Hoffman's resolutions was the
following:
If I have ever had any connection with a cause, I will never permit myself (when
that connection is from any reason severed) to be engaged on the side of my former
antagonist. Nor shall any change in the formal aspect of the cause induce me to
regard it as a ground of exception. It is a poor apology for being found on the
opposite side, that the present is but the ghost of the former cause.4

Neither Jackson nor Hoffman seems to have appealed to the ethics
of a profession. For both men, rules of proper conduct appear to have
been standard across occupational lines. Still, the contrast between the
reality of Jackson's conduct and the aspiration of Hoffman deserves explanation. It is possible that the elite who made up the bar sought to
protect themselves-witness the court's rejection of the malpractice action. But that explanation is not consistent with Jackson's argument
against a residency requirement. 46 If the elite wanted to protect themselves they should have attempted to limit access to the profession as
well as to thwart malpractice actions. Moreover, not until Judge George
Sharswood's 1854 lectures do we have an argument for a distinct professional ethics.47
In the absence of an established, self-protecting elite, we need to
look elsewhere to begin understanding the benchmark provided by this
volume. We need look no further than the legal system itself. In the
early 1800s, the Tennessee legal system was still immature. There was
not yet a strong sense of distinction between law and politics. In the
absence of a professional bench and bar, decisions of courts retained
much of the character of community decisions, in which it was appropriate for everyone to participate, accepting certain of the characteristics of the rough-and-tumble politics of the times. 4s Hoffman's 1836
work represents the final vestige of that undifferentiated system. By
then there was developing a court system and bar which increasingly
viewed itself as a profession. One result of that development was Sharswood's attempt to establish a separate professional ethic.4 9 The Legal

Papers of Andrew Jackson suggests that the development of a conscience peculiar to lawyers went hand-in-hand with the separation of
44. T. SHAFFER, supra note 41, at 59-68. The entire list is published as an appendix to J. RAM,
A TREATISE ON FACTS AS SUBJECTS OF INQUIRY BY A JURY 386-99 (J. Townshend 3d Am. ed. 1873).
45. J. RAM, supra note 44, at 387.
46. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
47. T. SHAFFER, supra note 41, at 76-77, 167-77.
48. Cf. J. NOONAN, supra note 39, at 31 (indicating that "[tlo put an antibribery ethic into
practice in even a limited sphere-as opposed to announcing what it should be-required men
professionally interested in the process of judging; it required a corps of men whose skill consisted
in the presentation of facts and law and argument").
49. For a more complete discussion of this point, see T. SHAFFER, supra note 41, at 167-361.
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law from politics and the molding of a separate legal profession. But
this collection of papers achieves its purpose by suggesting that, and
doubtless other topics for research.
The Legal Papers of Andrew Jackson thus provides a fertile starting point for further research into the emergence of an American law
and the development of legal ethics. The value of the book, however, is
not limited to those two topics; the cases and notes in this volume are
replete with hints and nudges toward any number of other profitable
paths for investigation. A wide range of scholars will therefore be indebted to the editors and publisher for making these papers readily
available.

